German perspectives

Erich von Manstein

25 November 1939

Earlier this month Army Group A gained two Panzer divisions. I am glad that Hitler sees the sense in my proposal that Halder clearly does not recognize…

However, this is does not suffice. General Guderian sings the same tune as me on the point that leading an offensive through Ardennes (despite it being a forested region) is feasible with the armoured formations in the frontline.

I firmly believe that if the primary spearhead of the offensive were to be shifted to the south, victory might very well be achieved. The failure of the Schlieffen Plan has led me to analyze the intricate flaws of the plan… there is an urgent need for pincer maneuvers in order to make possible a victory in France. Moreover, France would be anticipating for us to revive the Schlieffen plan in this offensive.

The only chance of defeating France who appears to be stronger than us is to find their Achilles’ heel from which we have to concentrate the entire attack on. My variation of Fall Gelb necessitates the transfer of the concentration of the offensive from the northern right wing to the center in the Ardennes region. There is little possibility that France would anticipate a German invasion from the Ardennes.. it does indeed come across as an almost incredulous idea to venture through the rough, narrow and swampy area of the Ardennes which presents a torturous road network. This mission would be an extraordinary logistical operation. However, we would not meet much resistance through this passage.